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Preliminary remarks
Dignity is generally regarded today as a fundamental value across legal sys-
tems, both at the international and national levels. Although dignity is not 
a precisely defined concept, there is a general consensus on the qualities that 
dignity possesses. As something considered to be inherent to human beings3, 
dignity is not acquired by means of any human action, nor can it be lost as the 
result of any action, including the actions of its possessor. It is considered the 
source of all human rights4, which, in turn, provide criteria for determining 
1  Prof. zw. dr hab. prawa, Uniwersytet Humanistycznospołeczny SWPS, Instytut Pra-
wa, Wydział Zamiejscowy w Poznaniu. 
2  This project was financed with funds from the National Science Centre (Poland) 
allocated on the basis of the decision, number DEC-2013/09/B/HS5/04232. A forthcoming 
monograph, Plato’s Conception of Justice: Dignity Approach, will be published by Peter Lang 
International Academic Publishers. M. Piechowiak is Professor at the Institute of Law (Faculty 
in Poznań), SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, where he heads the Depart-
ment of Theory, Philosophy and History of Law.
3  Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which begins: “Whereas 
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members 
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”, Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. GAOR, 
3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A. Here the references to the characteristics of dignity 
are limited to a few selected documents defining the ideological basis of modern human 
rights law; see: M. Piechowiak, What are Human Rights? The Concept of Human Rights 
and Their Extra-Legal Justification, [in:] An Introduction to the International Protection of 
Human Rights. A Textbook, eds R. Hanski, M. Suksi, 2nd, revised edition (Turku–Åbo: Åbo 
Akademi University: Institute for Human Rights, 1999), pp. 3–14.
4  Preambles to the International Covenants on Human Rights: “these rights derive 
from the inherent dignity of the human person”, International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Preamble to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action: “Recognizing and affirming that all human rights derive from the dignity and worth 
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the justice of laws. These criteria are considered to be given, objective and not 
relative; they are therefore not subject to the will of lawmakers, and provide 
a “shield” for minorities from the will of the majority5. Dignity is considered 
inviolable6 and should never be sacrificed for the sake of other values – the 
possessor of dignity (his/her good) is an end in itself, an autotelic end and 
can therefore never be treated purely instrumentally. A very important con-
sequence of recognising the inviolability of dignity is its impact on how we 
understand the relationship between the individual and the law and state: the 
aim of laws founded upon the recognition of dignity and human rights, and 
the subsequent aim of a state based on such laws, is the good of the individual. 
inherent in the human person, and that the human person is the central subject of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and consequently should be the principal beneficiary 
and should participate actively in the realization of these rights and freedoms (...)”, Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action adopted 25 June 1993 by the World Conference on 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23.
5  Vienna Declaration (1993), I.1: “Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the 
birthright of all human beings; their protection and promotion is the first responsibility 
of Governments”.
6  Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union, art. 1: “Human dignity is inviola-
ble. It must be respected and protected”, Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union 
proclaimed 7 Dec. 2000, Official Journal of the European Communities 18.12.2000, 
C 364/01. On the universal (U.N.) level of the international protection of human rights, 
point two of the Proclamation of Teheran (1968) recognizes the inviolability of these rights 
and the inviolability of dignity as the source of these rights. This is indirectly acknowledged 
here: “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states a common understanding of the 
peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the 
human family and constitutes an obligation for the members of the international commu-
nity”, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April 
to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 at 3. Cf. Basic Law for the Federal Republic 
of Germany (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland), adopted 23 May 1949, 
art. 1: “(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of 
all state authority. (2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable 
human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world”. print 
version as at: October 2010, translated by Ch. Tomuschat and D.P. Currie (translation 
revised by Ch. Tomuschat and D.P. Kommers in cooperation with the Language Service of 
the German Bundestag). The Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Konstytucja Rzeczy-
pospolitej Polskiej), adopted 2 April 1997, art. 30: “The inherent and inalienable dignity of 
the person shall constitute a source of freedoms and rights of persons and citizens. It shall 
be inviolable. The respect and protection thereof shall be the obligation of public authori-
ties.” (Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws), No. 78, item 483), trans. A. Pol and A. Caldwell, 
[in:] Polish Constitutional Law: the Constitution and Selected Statutory Materials, eds. 
E. Gierach and P. Chybalski, Chancellery of the Sejm: Warsaw 2009, p. 26.
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Thus, individuals are not meant to serve the state and the law, but rather, the 
state and the law are meant to serve the individual. 
As something inherent to, and thus, inseparable from human beings, digni-
ty is considered to be universal – all human beings are born equal in dignity7, 
regardless of culture, regardless of time, regardless of level of development, 
physical or mental ability, or any other mutable human qualities. This univer-
sality of dignity provides the basis for the universality of human rights8. 
It is something of a paradox that recognition in the law of the inherent na-
ture of dignity and the universality of people’s entitlement to it is accompanied 
in contemporary culture by the widespread acceptance of cultural relativism 
– the belief that values are a “product” of a given culture rather than being 
something which exists objectively. If we adopt such a point of view, we ought 
to acknowledge that as an axiological foundation of the legal system, dignity is 
also a product of the culture of a given time and place and that the attribution 
of certain characteristics to it is thus not based on a recognition (knowledge) 
of reality. Dignity therefore cannot be considered as objectively existing. The 
assumption that dignity is conditioned by culture inevitably leads to its con-
ceptual “disenchantment” and where it is viewed from such a perspective, an 
inherent dignity simply does not exist and the concept of dignity is empty. At 
best, the inherence and universality of dignity could be considered as legal 
fictions, a convenient tool for constructing legal systems. However, one con-
sequence of this would be a repudiation of the universality of human rights, 
meaning the promotion of their protection could justifiably be considered 
a manifestation of cultural imperialism. 
If the concept of dignity, as it is used in modern law, expresses something 
inborn and not created by culture, then those aspects of human existence that 
are fundamental to it in terms of the proper treatment of others and the rela-
tionship between individuals and the state would have also been considered 
in the past, especially in philosophy and by the greatest philosophers in par-
ticular. An important argument in favour of recognising the cultural relativism 
and fictional nature of the legal concept of dignity is the claim that dignity as 
a reason for non-instrumental treatment was recognised only in modernity 
7  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), art. 1: “All human beings are born 
(...) equal in dignity and rights”.
8  Vienna Declaration (1993), I, 1: “The universal nature of these rights and freedoms 
is beyond question”. Cf. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted 
13 Dec 2006, G.A. Res. 61/106, Annex II, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 80, U.N. 
Doc. A/61/49, Preamble, c).
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and that its concept was a product of philosophical thought specific to this 
period9 – particularly that of Immanuel Kant, who is generally considered 
the father of the concept of dignity as it is used today in the language of law 
and jurisprudence. This claim, however, proves not to be true. It is relatively 
common knowledge that reflections on dignity were present during the Re-
naissance in the tractates of such authors as Gianozzo Manetti and Giovanni 
Pico della Mirandola. It is more rarely observed that a well-developed concept 
of human dignity, including its recognition as the basis for personhood, had 
already been developed in the Middle Ages10. 
For establishing the universality of dignity, it would be significant if re-
flections on the concept, or on what today is expressed (understood) through 
it, could be found in some of ancient philosophy’s most precious gems – the 
writings of Plato. Reflections on Plato as someone who contributed to the 
understanding of the dignity of a person in a positive way and not only by 
providing a contrasting totalitarian framework, seem, however, to be absent 
today in academic discussions about the universality of human rights and their 
foundation in universal dignity. One of the reasons for this state of affairs is 
that Plato is nowadays often seen – thanks largely to Karl Popper – as a totali-
tarian ideologue, as someone who provides justifications for the view that the 
individual is meant to serve the state, rather than the state serving the individ-
ual. Plato is therefore seen as rejecting a fundamental thesis upon which the 
recognition of human dignity as being universal is grounded11. In his dialogue 
Republic, Plato writes that
9  However, it still would be inconclusive, since one could argue that the development 
of culture leads to the creation of better intellectual tools (concepts, ideas) for understand-
ing reality and from the lack of these tools one cannot infer that reality itself does not exist.
10  For a comparison of the philosophical conceptions of dignity proposed by Kant and 
Aquinas, see: M. Piechowiak, Auf der Suche nach einer philosophischen Begründung der 
Würde des Menschen bei Thomas von Aquin und Immanuel Kant, [in:] Würde – dignité – 
godność – dignity. Die Menschenwürde im internationalen Vergleich, eds C. Baumbach and 
P. Kunzmann (München: Herbert Utz Verlag, 2010), pp. 289–319.
11  See: K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1: The Spell of Plato, 5th 
ed. (1966), (Ewing, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1971). Popper’s book was widely criticised 
by historians of philosophy. Among the most important of these critical monographs are 
G.J. de Vries, Antisthenes Redivivus. Popper’s Attack on Plato (Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing Company, 1952); J. Wild, Plato’s Modern Enemies and The Theory of Natu-
ral Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); A.B. Levinson, In Defense of Plato 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1953). Popper’s response to his critics can be found in the 
above-mentioned edition of The Open Society.
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the law is not concerned with the special happiness of any class in the state, 
but is trying to produce this condition in the city as a whole, harmonizing 
and adapting the citizens to one another by persuasion and compulsion, 
and requiring them to impart to one another any benefit which they are 
severally able to bestow upon the community, and that it itself creates such 
men in the state, not that it may allow each to take what course pleases 
him, but with a view to using them for the binding together of the com-
monwealth12. 
In accordance with the absolute subordination of the good of the individual 
to the good of the state, the state establishes aims that particular individuals 
specializing in such types of tasks are meant to carry out (ruling the state, 
defence, production), and each citizen 
must be brought to that which naturally suits him –one man, one job – so 
that each man, practicing his own, which is one, will not become many but 
one; and thus, you see, the whole city will naturally grow to be one and not 
many13.
Was Plato really blind to dignity as a reason for a non-instrumental treat-
ment of an individual? The purpose of this study is to examine the works of 
Plato from the point of view of the concept of dignity as it functions today, 
looking for elements of the modern concept of dignity in his philosophy. As it 
turns out, a number of such elements can indeed be found. Moreover, focusing 
on the issue of dignity fundamentally alters our reading of Plato’s doctrine of 
justice, studies of which are usually based on analyses of his Republic and ones 
that generally emphasize the total subordination of the individual to the state.
Analysing the works of Plato in terms of its approach to the universality of 
dignity does not require that we search for concepts and related constructions 
that are identical to those used today, nor do we need to look for Greek terms 
that closely correspond to these concepts (one candidate would be the word 
‘άξία’). Neither would the universality of dignity and human rights be under-
mined by an acknowledgement that the specific usage of such terms and con-
cepts is relative to a particular culture or time, as well as to the broader the- 
 
12  Plato, Republic, 519e–520a, in: Plato in Twelve Volumes, vols. 5–6, trans. Paul Sho-
rey (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP–London: William Heinemann, 1969); the analyses 
presented in this paper are based on the text in Greek; English translations were selected 
on the basis of their accuracy in a given context and thus, fragments of the same dialogue 
are at times rendered in different translations.
13  Idem, Republic, 423d, trans. Paul Shorey. 
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oretical contexts in which it occurs. It is sufficient to consider that the terms, 
concepts and theories we use at a given time and place are intellectual tools 
for recognizing and familiarizing something that exists in reality. In the work 
of Plato, we must therefore seek the constitutive elements of what comprises 
the concept of dignity today, taking into account the specific functions these 
elements fulfil in relation to this concept; e.g., in how they define the relation-
ship between the individual and the state. Such elements can be considered an 
anticipation of the modern-day concept of dignity. If we recognize that con-
cepts are culturally specific tools for understanding reality, it is reasonable to 
focus our analysis on dignity rather than on human rights. Since dignity is the 
source of human rights, the recognition of dignity is more fundamental than 
the recognition of human rights per se. As a result, it can be assumed that it 
will be easier to find anticipations of the concept of dignity than anticipations 
of the modern concept of human rights. A crucial question is therefore wheth-
er reflections on what today is expressed by means of the concept of dignity in 
relation to human rights law can be found in the works of Plato.
Plato was a systemic thinker, and in order to understand Plato’s doctrine of 
the state, one needs to consider the broader systemic context. An attempt to 
understand Plato’s doctrines of justice and the relationship of the individual 
to the state should not begin – as most such attempts do – with an analysis of 
works dealing directly with the state or the law. A better starting point, and 
one that will be used in the current analysis, is an early part of the speech of 
the Demiurge to the gods in Timaeus, one of Plato’s later dialogues. This text 
is analysed here to identify Plato’s viewpoint on the question of what quality 
positively and radically distinguishes certain creatures from other beings, and 
simultaneously provides a reason for treating these creatures in a radically 
different way than other beings that do not possess this quality. An analysis of 
Timaeus therefore indicates that Plato recognizes important aspects of the au-
totelic nature of certain creatures, not only of goods but also of human beings. 
This is reflected not only in his recognition of human beings as the essential 
purpose (aim) of the natural world, but also in his clearly expressed recogni-
tion that the purpose of the law and the state is the benefit of the individual; 
moreover, one of the principal objectives of law in this context is to lead to the 
equality of all members of a community. This study therefore includes a com-
mentary on Plato’s conception of justice, which, on the one hand, represents 
an extension of arguments in favour of an ancient anticipation of the concept 
of dignity and, on the other, one that indicates a line of argumentation for 
challenging the common perception of Plato as an ideologue of totalitarianism. 
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Plato’s work can be seen to contain essential components of the modern 
concept of dignity, ones recognizing the unique proprieties of dignity. Plato 
also discusses what dignity is, an issue that even today – despite the wide-
spread recognition of many of dignity’s features – is hard to reach consensus 
on. This particular issue, it may be argued, is important for establishing a line 
of continuity in our thinking about dignity and human rights in today’s cul-
ture. Thus, unless we have an answer to the question of what is dignity, we 
are powerless against the charge that the modern legal concept of dignity is 
an empty concept. Plato looks for dignity in the existential aspect of beings, 
in the particulars of their way of existence and not in the qualities they are 
endowed with. This allows dignity to be recognised therefore as the inherent 
source of all human rights, regardless of specific changeable characteristics of 
each human being.
I. The Demiurge’s speech in the dialogue Timaeus 
1. Formal aspects of the text
The key text – split into smaller fragments to make it easier to analyse – is as 
follows: 
when all gods had come to be, both the ones who make their rounds con-
spicuously and the ones who present themselves only to the extent that 
they are willing, the begetter of this universe spoke to them. This is what 
he said:
“O gods, works divine whose maker and father I am, 
whatever has come to be by my hands cannot be undone but by my con-
sent.
Now while it is true that anything that is bound is liable to being undone, 
still, only one who is evil would consent to the undoing of what has been 
well fitted together and is in fine condition. 
This is the reason why you, as creatures that have come to be, are neither 
completely immortal nor exempt from being undone.
Still, you will not be undone nor will death be your portion,
since you have receive the guarantee of my will – a greater, more sovereign 
bond than those with which you were bound when you came to be”14.
14  Idem, Timaeus, 41a-b, trans. D.J. Zeyl, in Plato Complete Works, ed. J.M. Cooper 
(Indianapolis–Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), pp. 1224–1291. See: M. Piechowiak, Przemowa 
Demiurga w Platońskim „Timajosie” a współczesne pojęcie godności [The Demiurge’s speech 
in Plato’s “Timaeus” and the Contemporary Concept of Dignity], [in:] Abiit, non obiit. 
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An analysis of the above passage needs to be prefaced with some introduc-
tory comments concerning the place of the analysed text among the works of 
Plato. First, it should be noted that the dialogue Timaeus is one of Plato’s later 
works and is considered one of his most important and mature works. Second-
ly, certain formal aspects of the speech of the Demiurge need to be specifically 
addressed. In reading Plato, we have to consider the formal choices made by 
the author, such as who expresses particular views. In the above fragment, we 
have to take into account the fact that Plato puts these words into the mouth 
of the creator of the world, who is certainly considered to be a being of special 
excellence (the problem of how he is related to the idea of good can be left 
aside here). He is speaking to the gods, whom he has created, and it is relevant 
that the addressees of his speech are conspicuous by their excellence – in intel-
lect, as well – because this means it is possible to speak to them about difficult 
subjects in a straightforward manner. These are clear signs on the formal level 
that the statements made by the Demiurge are considered by Plato to be par-
ticularly weighty. Of course, Plato’s story about the Demiurge’s speech is itself 
formulated as a myth; however, the issue of the functions performed in Plato’s 
works by the myths he relates is a separate issue, a wider discussion of which 
is not possible here, nor – it would seem – necessary. Plato himself provides 
a succinct statement about this issue in the dialogue Gorgias, where Socrates 
comments on the telling of a myth, saying to the sophist Callicles: 
Possibly, however, you regard this as an old wife’s tale, and despise it; and 
there would be no wonder in our despising it if with all our searching we 
could somewhere find anything better and truer than this15. 
The analysed fragment of the Demiurge’s speech is not addressed to hu-
mans, but to more perfect beings – gods who are to help the Demiurge in 
forming the world, including the formation of human beings endowed with 
a mortal body. The analysis here will focus on a general question that concerns 
more than just humanity: what, according to Plato, determines the specific, 
qualitatively superior position of certain beings, which carries with it conse-
quences of a normative nature requiring special, privileged treatment for these 
beings. Moreover, one can posit it is also important to identify in what way 
this treatment is special. 
Księga poświęcona pamięci Księdza Profesora Antoniego Kościa SVD, eds A. Dębiński a. o. 
(Lublin, Wydawnictwo KUL, 2013), pp. 655–665.
15  Plato, Gorgias, 527a, [in:] Plato in Twelve Volumes, vol. 3, trans. W.R.M. Lamb 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP–London: William Heinemann, 1967).
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2. Complexity and immortality
To reconstruct the reasoning used in the analysed portion of the Demiurge’s 
speech, one needs to start with the statement that all things which are comprised 
of elements (“bound”) can be broken down (“is liable to being undone”), and thus 
in themselves are not immortal. If considered from a systemic perspective, this 
leads to the conclusion that in Plato’s philosophy all things are complex, except 
for the idea of good, which may be equalised with the idea of unity. All things 
that are created or born are complex – even the gods are not “exempt from being 
undone”16 and therefore, are not indestructible or immortal. 
The statements analysed here – it would seem – are generally underappre-
ciated. On their basis it seems that Plato’s arguments for the immortality of 
the soul as discussed in the literature (including textbooks), most of which are 
contained in the dialogue Phaedo17, are deemed inconclusive by Plato himself 
– they may offer comfort to those facing death and provide guidance to those 
in search of answers, but they are not proofs in the full sense of the word. The 
human soul is a created thing, it is “born”, it is complex, so in itself, it is neither 
indestructible nor immortal. In terms of their complexity and the consequent 
lack of indissolubility that is vested in the very nature (internal structure) of 
being, all beings are alike – gods, people and the world of things. 
3. Dignity as existential perfection 
One may ask what is special about the addressees of the speech. In terms of 
their genesis, what is special is that they were created (formed) directly by the 
Demiurge. Do these beings, however, possess in themselves something that 
would provide a reason for referring to them or treating them in a special, 
privileged way? Plato explains that what is created directly by the Demiurge, 
is “well fitted together and is in fine condition” – καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ. 
Instead of “well fitted together”, a more apt translation would be a word-for-
16  Plato, Timaeus, 41b.
17  On its similarities to what is eternal and unchanging, based on internal unity; on 
the rule of the soul over the body; on the kinship to what is divine and the opposition to 
what is mortal – Phaedo, 78b-80b; on the analysis of the nature of the soul as the principle 
of life – Phaedo, 105c, Phaedrus, 245c; on inborn knowledge and anamnesis – Phaedo, 95c-d; 
on the claim that the soul cannot be destroyed by an evil proper to it (injustice) – Republic, 
609a-611b.
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word translation of καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν – “beautifully harmonized”18. Why this 
particular phrase? Is the harmonizing of the parts directly related to being “in 
fine condition” (ἔχον εὖ) a fundamental matter? Is this more than just an issue 
of the aesthetic values that ought to be respected and protected? 
To understand the essence of the matter, we have to look at the context of 
the overall system. In the dialogue Republic, the idea of good is the highest 
idea, something qualitatively more perfect than anything else: “the good itself 
is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power”19. 
The symbol of good itself is the Sun – “The sun, I presume you will say, not 
only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their 
generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation”20. Plato 
thus considers the idea of the good to be  the source of existence: “the objects of 
knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, 
but their very existence and essence [καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν] is derived 
to them from it”21. With the aid of Plato’s so-called unwritten teachings, it is 
possible to reasonably identify good with unity22. Good is total unity, and in 
granting unity, we grant being, thereby granting existence and life. Granting 
existence means granting unity, according to the basic intuition that unity is 
the basis of existence, because what has no unity does not exist, it breaks down 
and ceases to exist23. “Beautiful harmonization” and “in fine condition” are 
the basis of unity, and thus of perfection in the order of existence – the more 
something is internally united (more harmonized), the more it exists.
Thus, if dignity becomes associated with unity based on internal harmony 
(“beautiful harmonizing”), then dignity proves to be a special property belong-
ing to the order of existence. Attributing dignity to a thing first and foremost 
18  W.R.M. Lamb translates this as “fairly joined together”; taking into account the im-
portance of beauty and harmony in Plato’s philosophy, a word-for-word translation seems 
the most accurate.
19  Plato, Republic, 509b, trans. Paul Shorey.
20  Ibidem.
21  Ibidem.
22  E.g., the testimony of Aristoxenus (Aristoxenus, Elementa Harmonica, II, 39,8– 
–40,4); Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, 1095a-b; Metaphysics, 987b-988a, 1091b; Eudemian 
Ethics, 1218a); see: A. Incampo, Sul fondamento della validità deontica. Identità non-con-
tradictione (Bari: Giuseppe Laterza Editore, 1996), pp. 91–139; on the unwritten teaching 
of Plato see e.g. K. Gaiser, Platons ungeschriebene Lehre (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998); 
T. Szlezák, Reading Plato, trans. G. Zanker (London: Routledge, 1999).
23  See: A. Incampo, Sul fondamento della validità deontica. Identità non-contradic-
tione, pp. 91–139, esp. 93, 110.
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expresses something about how that thing exists, and not about what it is 
like. Existence and the manner of existence encompass all things that exist in 
a certain way and thus encompass all the traits of a given individual. If dignity 
thus understood is ascribed to human beings, then the special quality related 
to dignity is acquired by everything that is within a human being, both what is 
biological and what is psychological or spiritual. Such an approach shapes an 
ontological framework, which allows for an explanation of why human rights 
protect not only what is specific to human beings, such as being free and ra-
tional, but also potentially all aspects of a human being.
4. Prohibition on instrumental treatment
A particular form of internal perfection based on internal unity and the manner 
of existence that accompany it are the reason for the special treatment of those 
who possess it, as Plato writes: “only one who is evil would consent to the undo-
ing of what has been well fitted together and is in fine condition”24. The Demiurge 
himself is good, or even – if he is identified with the Platonic idea of good – 
good itself25. For this reason, it is impossible for him to ever want to destroy the 
possessor of dignity. Moreover, the Demiurge emphasizes that the addressees 
of his speech will never be destroyed. Thus, the reason for special treatment is 
always present – in the language of today, it is innate or inherent. Further, this 
reason can be described as a particular unity of being, a particularly perfect way 
of existence, a beautiful internal harmony or – simply – as dignity. One can also 
argue that since dignity is understood as existential perfection, this perfection is 
radically inherent (inseparable), and is independent of any particular quality or 
qualities and the manner in which an individual acts. Therefore it is impossible 
to lose dignity without losing one’s very existence.
It should be emphasized in this context that the prohibition on destroying 
a possessor of dignity is absolute in the sense that it was formulated with 
24  Plato, Timaeus, 41b, trans. D.J. Zeyl.
25  For a different view, see: G. Reale, History of Ancient Philosophy, vol. 2: Plato and Aris-
totle, trans. J.R. Catan (Albany: State University of New York State, 1990), p. 114: “the Platonic 
God is ‘he who is good’ in the personal sense, whereas ‘the Idea of the Good’ is the Good in the 
impersonal sense”. G. Reale (op.cit., pp. 113–114) refers to the statements from Timaeus, that 
the Demiurge is “the best of intelligible beings” and “the best of causes” (Timaeus, 37a; 29a). In 
the light of the problem of dignity and immortality warranted by the will of Demiurge, this is 
not convincing – to be a source of immortality which is based on unity, the Demiurge himself 
has to be a source of unity and as such has to be unity as the idea of good. 
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a view to achieving goals that go beyond the good of the possessors of dignity 
themselves, such as the good of the state or the cosmos as a whole. The pos-
sessors of dignity are an end in themselves, although this does not exclude the 
possibility that such entities are essential for the whole of the universe to be 
perfect and that, in this sense, they benefit the whole26.
The statement that destroying a possessor of dignity (of unity based on 
a beautiful internal harmony) would be the act of one who is evil is true not 
only for the Demiurge, but is universal – no being, in so far as it is good, would 
want to threaten the existence of a possessor of dignity. From a systemic point 
of view, according to Plato, being good is the duty of all that exists – striving 
for existence is striving for an internal unity which is equal with goodness). 
A general prohibition can therefore be formulated against the destruction of 
beings endowed with dignity. In other words, whenever such an entity is the 
addressee of such an action, one has to bear in mind that – regardless of their 
individual characteristics, as the result of dignity itself (internal structure) – it 
has a right to its own existence, which should always be respected in these 
actions. This idea is in line with the personalistic norm as formulated today, 
regarded as a simple consequence of dignity. As Immanuel Kant writes, 
man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely 
as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, 
whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always re-
garded at the same time as an end27; 
and in consequence – 
So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any 
other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only28.
5. Human beings and the gods
The Demiurge’s speech is addressed to the gods. How far do the findings about 
their excellence apply also to human beings? In the dialogue Timaeus, Plato 
writes that in creating the universe, the Demiurge himself creates a particle that 
the gods will use to create a human being. This particle is immortal because it 
26  See: Plato, Timaeus, 41b-c; Plato, Laws, 903b-e.
27  I. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, pp. 64–65 (428), trans. 
T.K. Abbott (New York: Cosimo, 2008).
28  I. Kant, Fundamental Principles..., 66 f. (429). 
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is created directly by the Demiurge and so possesses the same excellence that 
is the very reason for gods being immortal. Plato’s Demiurge says to the gods: 
And to the extent that it is fitting for them to possess something that shares 
our name of ‘immortal’, something described as divine and ruling within 
those of them who always consent to follow after justice and after you, 
I shall begin by sowing that seed, and then hand it over to you. The rest of 
the task is yours. Weave what is mortal to what is immortal, fashion and 
beget living things. Give them food, cause them to grow, and when they 
perish, receive them back again29.
Later in the dialogue, Plato writes,
Now we ought to think of the most sovereign part of our soul as god’s gift 
to us, given to be our guiding spirit. This, of course, is the type of soul that, 
as we maintain, resides in the top part of our bodies. It raises us up away 
from the earth and toward what is akin to us in heaven, as though we are 
plants grown not from the earth but from heaven. In saying this, we speak 
absolutely correctly30.
There is no space here alas, to address further Plato’s concepts of the indi-
vidual or the soul31. What is clear is that this particular element in us, created 
directly by the Demiurge, gives character to the whole person – “raises us up 
away from the earth”32.
Plato thus sees a qualitative difference between human beings and other 
entities in the natural world, with the essence of this difference lying in the fact 
that other living things (plants33) were created by the gods for human beings, 
who comprise their aim. At the end of the story about the creation of human 
beings, Plato writes in Timaeus:
Of necessity, however, it came about that he lived his life surrounded by 
fire and air, which caused him to waste away and be depleted, and so to 
29  Plato, Timaeus, 41c-d, trans. D.J. Zeyl. 
30  Idem, Timaeus, 90a, trans. D.J. Zeyl.
31  See: L.P. Gerson, Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006).
32  The argument in favour of the immortality of the soul based on the will of the 
Demiurge and Plato’s own questioning of the conclusiveness of the arguments formulated 
in Phaedo are overlooked by Gerson in his monograph Knowing Persons; nor are these 
problems mentioned in the chapter devoted to Phaedo (pp. 50–98), or in his analyses of 
Timaeus (pp. 239–250).
33  In his story, Plato speaks only of the creation of plants by the gods – animals are gen-
erated of people; see: Plato, Timaeus, 90d-92c.
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perish. The gods, therefore, devised something to protect him. They made 
another mixture and caused another nature to grow, one congenial to our 
human nature though endowed with other features and other sensations, so 
as to be a different living thing. These are now cultivated trees, plants and 
seeds, taught by the art of agriculture to be domesticated for our use. (...) 
All these varieties were planted by our masters, to whom we are subject, 
to nourish us34.
In relation to the universe, human beings are therefore seen to be an essen-
tial element for the perfection of the whole and, in this sense, are for the good 
of the whole35. However, as in the case of the gods, acceptance of the thesis 
that the purpose of the creation of human beings is the perfection of the whole 
does not preclude the thesis that their existence is an aim in itself, a result of 
their particular perfection. It should also be noted that the relationship of hu-
mans to the whole of the universe is essentially a different question from that 
of their relationship to the law and the state. 
II. The individual in relation to the law and state
In light of the above analysis, one may opine it is easy to support an inter-
pretation of Plato’s texts on the state and law in which both are ultimately 
subordinated to the good of the individual, rather than the individual to the 
good of the state. The following statement from Laws should be considered 
a key statement by Plato for defining the relationship between human beings 
and the state: 
Now the fundamental purpose of our laws was this, – that the citizens 
should be as happy as possible, and in the highest degree united in mutual 
friendship36.
The first aim of the law is the happiness of the citizens, the second – along-
side it – is friendship; the latter element is related to the issue of equality and 
will be discussed in a later section. Like the law, the state plays a fully subordi-
nate role to the development of the individual:
34  Plato, Timaeus, 77a, 77c, trans. D.J. Zeyl.
35  Idem, Timaeus, 41b-c: ‘There remain still three kinds of mortal beings that have not yet 
been begotten; and as long as they have not come to be, the universe will be incomplete, for it 
will still lack within it all the kinds of living things it must have if is to be sufficiently complete”, 
trans. D.J. Zeyl; see: Plato, Laws, 903b-e.
36  Idem, Laws, 743c, [in:] Plato in Twelve Volumes, vols. 10 & 11, trans. R.G. Bury 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP–London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1967 & 1968).
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whatsoever be the way in which a member of our community – be he of the 
male or female sex, young or old, – may become a good citizen, possessed 
of the excellence of soul which belongs to man, whether derived from some 
pursuit or disposition, or from some form of diet, or from desire or opinion 
or mental study, to the attainment of this end all his efforts throughout the 
whole of his life shall be directed; and not a single person shall show him-
self preferring any object which impedes this aim; in fine, even as regards 
the State, he must allow it to be revolutionized [ἀνάστατον], if it seems 
necessary, rather than voluntarily submit to the yoke of slavery under the 
rule of the worse, or else he must himself quit the State as an exile: all such 
sufferings men must endure rather than change to a polity which naturally 
makes men worse37.
The weight of the words in this quote is all the greater given the fact that 
these are the words of a Greek for whom the state remained an important el-
ement in defining their identity as an individual. It is difficult to find a clearer 
expression of the view that the state is in service to individuals – their devel-
opment, and not the state’s existence, is clearly the highest value in society – 
there are situations where it is even better for one’s own state to be destroyed38 
and for a citizen to be forced into exile. 
One might at this point note that the passages cited from Laws and Timae-
us are among Plato’s late works, in which he changed his views presented in 
the dialogue Republic on the objectives of the state and the law, as well as the 
37  Idem, Laws, 770 c-e, trans. R.G. Bury.
38  The original text translated above “allow it to be revolutionized” is considered to 
be incomplete (see: The Laws by Plato, edited with introduction, notes etc. by E.B. Eng-
land, Vol. 1: Books I–VI (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921, pp. 601–602). The term 
άνάστατον might be better translated as “desolated”. The essence of the passage is that the 
state ceases to exist – as in the aftermath of a revolution. This is in accordance with the 
statement that in some situations, the proper solution is to be exiled, to leave the state – 
for exiles, the state actually does cease to exist for them as their state. The examples Plato 
gives are also correct from the point of view of acknowledging happiness and friendship 
as the aims of law. It is difficult to be fully acknowledge as correct the classic Renaissance 
translation proposed by Marsilio Ficino: “Pro patria praeterea, si necesse sit, mori paratus 
sit antequam velit aut eversam videre civitatem iugoque servitutis subiectam a peioribus 
gubernari, aut fuga ipsam deserere” (in: The Laws by Plato, E.B. England, Vol. 1, 602), which 
George Burges translates as “he will at length even die for a state, rather than be willing to 
support the yoke of slavery, should there appear a necessity for it to be overthrown, and 
to be under the rule of worse men, or to quit it a not-state by flight”, The Works of Plato: 
A New and Literal Version, by G. Burges (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1852), Vol. V, 222; in 
the original text there is no reference to dying for one’s homeland.
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relationship between the individual and the state. However, bearing Plato’s 
doctrine of dignity in mind, the traditional interpretation of the Republic as 
a dialogue expressing the idea of the total subordination of an individual to 
the state can be easily revised. According to Plato’s intentions, this dialogue is 
meant primarily to be about justice of the individual, not about the state – the 
“ideal” state is constructed as a model of the individual’s soul, and is meant to 
help the reader understand justice as the highest perfection of the individual39. 
This issue certainly deserves more detailed study, but the present discussion 
must be confined to an indication of some general lines of interpretation. First, 
the closing statement of Plato’s thought experiment involving the construction 
of a model state needs to be treated seriously:
And this, Glaucon, turns out to be after all a kind of phantom of justice – 
that’s also why it’s helpful – the fact that the shoemaker by nature rightly 
practices shoemaking and does nothing else, and the carpenter practices 
carpentry, and so on for the rest40.
Plato here explicitly distances himself from an idea that had been central to 
his description of the model of the state – the performance by each individual 
of only one single action is merely a phantom [εἴδωλον] of justice. 
Plato’s Socrates continues: 
But in truth justice was, as it seems, something of this sort; however, not with 
respect to a man’s minding his external business, but with respect to what 
is within, with respect to what truly concerns him and his own. He doesn’t 
let each part in him mind other people’s business or the three classes in the 
soul meddle with each other, but really sets his own house in good order and 
rules himself; he arranges himself, becomes his own friend, and harmonizes 
the three parts, exactly like three notes in a harmonic scale, lowest, highest 
and middle. And if there are some other parts in between, he binds them 
together and becomes entirely one from many, moderate and harmonized. 
Then, and only then, he acts, if he does act in some way—either concerning 
the acquisition of money, or the care of the body, or something political, or 
concerning private contracts41. 
It should be emphasized that the cited passage begins with Socrates’ words 
“but in truth”; Glaucon, his partner in the dialogue, responds by saying: “Socrates, 
39  Plato, Republic, 368b-369a.
40  Idem, Republic, 443c, trans. A. Bloom.
41  Idem, Republic, 443c-e, trans. A. Bloom.
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(...) what you say is entirely true”42. Distancing himself here from viewing justice 
in the performance of just one type of activity, Plato describes a righteous indi-
vidual as one who “act[s] in some [443e] way – either concerning the acquisition 
of money, or the care of the body, or something political, or concerning private 
contracts”43.
The manner in which Plato described the objectives of the real state before 
he began his construction of an “ideal” state as a thought experiment also 
needs to be seriously considered:
a city, as I believe, comes into being because each of us isn’t self-sufficient 
but is in need of much. (...) when one man takes on another, for one need 
and another for another need, and, since many things are needed, many 
men gather in one settlement as partners and helpers, to this common 
settlement we give the name city44.
Importantly, it can be seen that nowhere in the dialogue does Plato consid-
er modifying this objective of the state.
The subordination by Plato of the state to the good of the individual can 
also be inferred from Gorgias, for instance, when Plato characterises politics 
not as an art that refers to the state, but as an art that “has to do with the 
soul”45, and consists of two components – legislation, which serves healthy 
souls, and penal justice (Plato calls it simply “justice”), which serves ill souls. 
In comparing legislation and penal justice with gymnastics and medicine, he 
states that these four elements “always bestow their care for the best advantage 
respectively of the body and the soul”46. In the same dialogue, the subservi-
ent role of the law and the state to the individual is clearly visible in Plato’s 
doctrine of criminal justice. The purpose of punishment is not primarily the 
restoration of an abstract order of values or order in the state, but the good of 
the offender, for whose soul punishment is a kind of cure47.
42  Idem, Republic, 444a, trans. A. Bloom. 
43  Idem, Republic, 443d-e, trans. A. Bloom.
44  Idem, Republic, 369a-c, trans. A. Bloom.
45  Idem, Gorgias, 464b, trans. W.R.M. Lamb.
46  Idem, Gorgias, 464c, trans. W.R.M. Lamb. 
47  Idem, Gorgias, 478d-e, 480a, trans. W.R.M. Lamb; see: M. Piechowiak, Plato’s Con-
ception of Punitive Justice, [in:] Universality of Punishment, eds. A. Incampo and W. Żełaniec 
(Bari: Cacucci, 2015), pp. 73–96; M.M. MacKenzie, Plato on Punishment (Berkeley–Los 
Angeles–London, University of California Press, 1981).
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In terms of the lines of interpretation relating to the issue of dignity, atten-
tion needs to be paid to the fact that Plato does not attribute this particular 
excellence to the state. Neither the state as a whole nor any of its elements 
were directly created by the Demiurge. Thus, it cannot be regarded as an end 
in itself. In Plato’s eyes, the state does not warrant having a place assigned to 
it in his descriptions of the universe (when he considers the elements which 
are important for its perfection), not to mention assigning it a special place48. 
III. Equality
From the point of view of the special internal structure underlying the particu-
larly perfect manner of existence of souls created directly by the Demiurge, 
and from the point of view of the basic responsibilities toward such beings (to 
wish them the permanent existence), there can be seen to be a fundamental 
equality. There is either such a particularly perfect manner of existence (an 
internal harmony) or there is not; there is no place for more or less. The fact 
that a human being always remains for Plato a special entity, whose individual 
good must be born in mind, is clearly visible in the Platonic doctrine of the 
law, the aim of which is not only the happiness of citizens, but also friendship49. 
Friendship is possible between equals, as noted in a saying Plato cites – “equal-
ity produces amity”50; it is equality in terms of moral perfection that represents 
the perfection of humanity, which in the language of today – can be seen in 
terms of its integral personal development. 
Further, the lack of equality is a fact: 
slaves and masters will never make friends, nor will worthless and worthy 
to whom equal honour is awarded for equal treatment results in inequality 
when it is given to what is unequal unless given in a due measure and both 
those two false relationships are the fruitful sources of civic discord51.
Recognising happiness and friendship as the aims of the law is also a recog-
nition of the attainment of equality as a goal, which is a necessary condition of 
friendship. In view of the Platonic doctrine of the transmigration of the soul, 
the achievement of this goal can be considered from the perspective of both 
48  Plato, Timaeus, 41b-c; see: Plato, Laws, 903b-e.
49  Idem, Laws, 743c. 
50  Ibidem, 757a.
51  Ibidem, trans. E.B. England.
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multiple generations and successive incarnations of the soul52. However, we 
need to recognize that even in today’s state of inequality, we have to consider 
how each individual is limited in his or her potential level of development. This 
is clearly evident when Plato writes about the treatment of slaves and those 
who are underprivileged:
Proper treatment of servants consists in using no violence towards them, and 
in hurting them even less, if possible, than our own equals. For it is his way of 
dealing with men whom it is easy for him to wrong that shows most clearly 
whether a man is genuine or hypocritical in his reverence for justice and 
hatred of injustice. He, therefore, that in dealing with slaves proves himself, 
in his character and action, [777e] undefiled by what is unholy or unjust will 
best be able to sow a crop of goodness, – and this we may say, and justly say, 
of every master, or king, and of everyone who possesses any kind of absolute 
power over a person weaker than himself53.
Conclusion
The above analyses, it may be seen, support the assumption made in the mod-
ern-day reflexion on human rights, proposing that dignity is something inher-
ent to each human being. Plato has, surprisingly, a lot to say on this subject. 
It is difficult not to see a clear convergence between the contemporary legal 
concept of dignity, which is recognised as the source of human rights and 
Plato’s reflection on perfection, which reflects qualitative differences between 
certain beings and the world of things. Plato offers here an answer to the ques-
tion “what is dignity?” According to him it is existential perfection, grounded 
in a particular perfect manner of being, based on a special internal unity of 
being. Since existential perfection encompasses a given individual as a whole, 
including all of their features, it provides a suitable basis for formulating pro-
posals about respecting all the elements required for the overall development 
of the possessor of dignity, which is inseparable from existence, for without 
dignity, the individual cannot exist. Consequently because dignity is primary 
to particular individual characteristics, it does not depend on their acquisition 
or loss, which provides a foundation for an equal – independent of any special 
52  Cf. e.g. Plato, Laws, 904e: “as thou becomest worse, thou goest to the company of 
the worse souls, and as thou becomest better, to the better souls; and that, alike in life and 
in every shape of death, thou both doest and sufferest what it is befitting that like should 
do towards like”, trans. R.G. Bury.
53  Plato, Laws, 777 d-e, trans. R.G. Bury.
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features – concern for the existence of all entities possessing dignity. Plato’s 
approach thus allows for the formulation of principles requiring us to treat 
each person as an end in themselves and to prohibit the treatment of persons 
in a purely instrumental manner. If dignity is situated in an existential aspect 
of being, the problem of personal development becomes a problem of “to be” 
and not “to have”, and it cannot be adequately approached with economic 
categories. 
Plato’s reflection on dignity (on known as dignity in our day and age) pro-
vides a new approach to the interpretation of his teaching on justice and the 
state. It can be argued therefore that if an individual exists as an end in them-
selves then, of course, the state exists for the individual, and not the individ-
ual for the state. Such an approach allows for a new reading of the dialogues 
Republic and Gorgias, which appear to express the view of the ancillary role 
of the state in relation to an individual. The main aim of the law and the state, 
it can therefore be argued, is the happiness of the members of the political 
community and their personal development. Recognising that friendship is the 
second principal aim of laws, Plato puts equality of all members of the political 
community on the agenda.
Summary
An important argument in favour of recognising the cultural relativism and against 
universality of dignity and human rights, is the claim that the concept of dignity is 
a genuinely modern one. An analysis of a passage from the Demiurge’s speech in 
Timaeus reveals that Plato devoted time to reflecting on the question of what deter-
mines the qualitative difference between certain beings (gods and human being) and 
the world of things, and what forms the basis for the special treatment of these be-
ings – issues that using the language of today can be described reasonably as dignity. 
The attributes of this form of dignity seem to overlap with the nature of dignity as 
we know it today. Moreover, Plato proposes a response both to the question of what 
dignity is like, as well as the question of what dignity is. It is existential perfection, 
rooted in a perfect manner of existence, based on a specific internal unity of being. 
Dignity is therefore primordial in regard to particular features and independent of 
their acquisition or loss. Plato’s approach allows him to postulate that people be 
treated as ends in themselves; an approach therefore that prohibits the treatment 
of people as objects. Both the state and law are ultimately subordinated to the good 
of the individual, rather than the individual to the good of the state.
25Plato and the Universality of Dignity
Keywords: Plato, immortality, dignity, human rights, universality of dignity, univer-
sality of human rights, equality, totalitarianism
Streszczenie
Istotny argument na rzecz relatywizmu kulturowego i przeciwko powszechności 
godności i wynikających z niej praw człowieka, oparty jest na poglądzie, że god-
ność uznana została dopiero w czasach nowożytnych. Analiza fragmentu mowy 
Demiurga z Platońskiego dialogu Timajos ujawnia, że Platon rozwinął refleksję nad 
czymś, co stanowi o jakościowej różnicy między pewnymi istotami (bogami i ludź-
mi) a światem rzeczy, i co jest podstawą szczególnego traktowania tych istot, a co 
językiem współczesnym zasadnie można określić jako godność. Zbieżna jest charak-
terystyka tej godności z charakterystyką przyjmowaną współcześnie. Co więcej, Pla-
ton daje propozycję odpowiedzi nie tylko na pytanie, jaka jest godność, ale także na 
pytanie, czym jest godność. Jest ona doskonałością egzystencjalną, ugruntowanym 
w szczególnie doskonałym sposobie istnienia, opartym na szczególnej wewnętrz-
nej jedności bytu. Jako doskonałość istnienia ogarnia ona cały byt, wszystkie jego 
cechy; jest nieoddzielalna od bytu (jest przyrodzona i niezbywalna). Jako pierwotna 
wobec partykularnych cech, jest niezależna od ich nabywania lub utraty. Platońskie 
ujęcie pozwala w oparciu o ujęcie godności formułować postulaty zbieżne z formu-
łowanymi dziś dyrektywami nakazującymi traktować osoby jako cele same w sobie 
i zakazującymi traktowania osób w sposób czysto instrumentalny, przedmiotowy. 
Okazuje się, że – zdaniem Platona – jednostki nie wolno traktować czysto instru-
mentalnie dla dobra państwa; zarówno państwo, jak i prawo są podporządkowane 
dobru jednostki.
Słowa kluczowe: Platon, nieśmiertelność, godność, prawa człowieka, powszech-
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